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ABSTRACT
Innovation has become the dominant economic idea of our time and has resulted in a
proliferation of innovation-oriented rhetoric, and policies. There is a great need to understand
and harness innovation, but it has proven to be as difficult to measure as it is to define. At
present, the quest to understand innovation hinges on finding reliable ways to identify and
measure it, the most promising of which is the analysis of patent information.
Patents have been increasingly used by economists to track inventiveness, the
transmission of knowledge, and their economic impact. However, it is evident that the
maiority of patents have little or no economic potential, and so merely observing the number
of patents provides little insight on innovation. It has become important, therefore, to develop
reliable methods for measuring the true economic potential of patents. Of all the solutions
proposed, the analysis of patent citations is the most promising.
This study examines the relationship between patent citations and the private
economic value of patents, and makes both theoretical and empirical contributions. First, the
previous literature is reviewed to further extend and clarify the theory of the economic
meaning of patent citations. Second, a typology of patent value is proposed to contextualize
the relevance of the theory under different appropriation regimes. Finally, this study tests the
economic meaning of citations using a new dataset where the licensing value of a group of
patents is observed directly. The findings confirm a consistent relationship between patent
citations and two different measures of patent value.
Thesis Advisor: Fiona Murray, Class of 1922 Career Development Associate Professor
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Introduction: Innovation and Patent Citation Analysis
Innovation has emerged as the dominant economic idea of our time (Nicholas, 1999).
It has disrupted the entrenched economic debate by changing the focus from who controls the
economy (eg. the market or the state) to what drives the economy. The result is an
astonishing new consensus reflected everywhere in the proliferation of innovation-oriented
rhetoric and policy initiatives. Economists have both driven and responded to this growing
awareness as evidenced by the burgeoning literature seeking answers to myriad questions
about the economic role and characteristics of innovation (Warsh, 2006). Despite important
advances, these efforts have been hindered by a scarcity of data and several important
methodological limitations (Trajtenberg, 1990b). Innovation has proven to be as difficult to
measure as it is to define (Jaffe, 1998; Nelson & Winter, 1977; von Hippel, 1987).
This predicament ultimately led researchers to use patents and publications as a
potentially rich supply of information for a variety of analyses (Griliches, 1990). However,
patents have also turned out to be recalcitrant research objects. For one thing, the extent to
which patents accurately track inventive technological progress is not fully understood and is
limited because of the very large proportion of patents that appear to have little or no
economic relevance (Griliches, 1990; Lanjouw, Pakes, & Putnam, 1998; Trajtenberg, 1990b).
Yet, while it is clear that economic attributes of interest are highly skewed, it has proven
impossible as yet to accurately identify and measure them. The difficulty is that there have
been no opportunities to systematically observe the actual economic value of patents
(Schankerman, 1998; Scherer, 1993; Trajtenberg, 1990b).
Several novel solutions to this puzzle have been developed, and unlocking the critical
economic information in patent data has been a growing thrust of the literature since at least
the late 1980's (Pakes, Hall, & Griliches, 1988; Pakes & Simpson, 1989; Schankerman &
Pakes, 1986). Of the solutions, the use of citations to trace the economic meaning of patents
has emerged as the most promising (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2001). As the patent data
have become electronically encoded and the software to analyze them more sophisticated,
citations have become accessible for econometric analysis. In particular, the creation of the
NBER Patent Data File in the 1990s was a major breakthrough in enabling a new generation
of citation studies (Hall et al., 2001).
While there are important institutional distinctions, patent citations serve a broadly
similar purpose as citations in academic literature (Jaffe & Trajtenberg, 2002). By law, every
patent is required to make reference to, or cite, previous inventions on which it is built and
which are publicly known - referred to as "prior art" (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2000).
Citations are included by the authors of patents and are also inserted by patent examiners as
part of the review of each application (Alcacer & Gittelman, 2004, 2006). As a result, patents
often have more citations when they issue than when they are originally filed (Alcacer &
Gittelman, 2006). The citations link patents together and are used primarily as a way of
establishing and bounding what is and what is not novel about the subject matter of the new
patent (Sampat, 2005).
The underlying economic intuition for studying the citations received by patents is
that a relatively greater number of citations from other patents implies that the patent has had
a greater technological impact (Griliches, 1990). The economic value of the patent is seen as
a function of its application, with a greater number of citations implying a relatively larger
number of applications. In this view, no distinction is made between public and private
economic value. A number of studies have looked at citations in this generalized way
(Henderson, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 1998; Trajtenberg, 1990b).
The patent system exists, among other things, to enable patent holders to capture a
certain portion of the public value of inventions, to motivate investments in the inventive
process, and to reward inventors, as well as to create incentives for disclosure. Therefore, it is
of interest to determine the degree to which the number of citations a patent receives
specifically tracks its economic value in much the same way that we would like to show that
a highly cited scientific publication has contributed more substantially to our knowledge than
a less cited publication. A brief review of the theory and literature on this topic is the subject
of Chapter 1.
To the degree that a link can be established between citations and private economic
value, a further step is needed to understand the specific types of private economic value that
patents create. Patents are actually complex economic entities that generate value through a
number of different mechanisms. Characterizing these modes is necessary for understanding
the meaning of citation data, and is the subject of Chapter 2.
In the absence of direct measures of patent value, a number of proxies have been
tested, but no systematic attempt has yet been made to relate them to the specific mechanisms
by which patents create value. Chapter 3 uses a typology of the private economic value of
patents developed in Chapter 2 to contextualize these methods. Chapter 4 describes the
dataset compiled for this study and presents the design of the empirical analyses. Finally,
Chapter 5 presents the analysis and findings of an original study in which the relationship
between citations and value is tested on a dataset where one type of private economic value is
observed directly, and discusses further implications of this research.
Chapter 1: Citations and Patent Value
Patents are a kind of economic good or asset, and as such, embody or enable the
creation of value (Griliches, 1990). The traditional conception of the link between patents
and value creation for the economy is quite old, although it has had many incarnations. A
common version of the idea is that a government guaranteed monopoly establishes
investments in technological development which would otherwise be sub-optimal in social
terms (Jaffe, 1998). Private returns are seen as the natural outcome of this approach and
indicative, to some degree, of the unmeasured social benefits. From another perspective,
patents offer the promise of abnormal private rents for the purpose of enabling enhanced
social benefits. The portion of the total economic value generated by the patent system that is
captured by patent holders as private value is not known, and it represents an important
economic question (Sampat & Ziedonis, 2004).
Citations have been used in a wide range of studies to estimate or proxy for the
economic value of patents (see Figure 1 in Chapter 3 for a listing of relevant studies
organized by their approach). In some cases, the distinction between social and private value
has been explicit (Sampat & Ziedonis, 2004), but in many cases it has not (Guellec &
Potterie, 2000). Many studies have looked at the value of patents without distinguishing
whether the value that is being measured is the entire economic value, the public value
enjoyed by all, or the private value captured by patent holders (Griliches, 1990; Jaffe, 1998).
This has sometimes led to research findings which are difficult to interpret, or to uses of
citation counts which have not been validated (Gay, Bas, Patel, & Touach, 2005). For
instance, in studies demonstrating evidence of a relationship between citations and the
likelihood of patent litigation, citations are used as the proxy for value (Harhoff & Reitzig,
2004; J. O. Lanjouw & M. A. Schankerman, 1997). However, it is possible to hypothesize
that both above average forward citations and the presence of litigation are to some degree
measurements of the same thing - competing interests in a particular technology. Also,
citations to prior art are often inserted by attorneys and patent examiners and do not
necessarily indicate the existence of a direct inventive contribution. Therefore, citations may
merely indicate increasing patent activity in a specific field (Sampat & Ziedonis, 2004).
Given the widespread use of citation counts as a stand-in for patent value, there is a
need to develop methods for validating the relationship between citations and economic
value, and particularly private economic value. The use of citation counts as an indicator of
value is valid only to the extent that citations actually track the phenomena of interest.
Theory of Citations and Patent Value
Validating the relationship between citations and patent value has been a major thrust
of a number of studies (Chapter 3 provides an overview and discussion of this literature).
There are two dimensions to this challenge. The first need is to develop a clear theoretical
foundation for the relationship between citations and economic value, a topic insufficiently
treated in the literature (Sampat & Ziedonis, 2004). The second need is for data and
techniques to empirically validate the relationship.
The basic theory underlying the idea that citations contain information about value as
described above was examined extensively by Trajtenberg (1990a). Harhoff et al. (1999)
describe two distinct theoretical justifications. The first is the concept described by many
(Griliches, 1990; Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & Fogarty, 2000; Lerner, 1994; Trajtenberg, 1990a) that
a patent receiving relatively more citations has greater scope, or application in a broader
range of areas. The disadvantage of this concept is that it conceptualizes value in a
generalized way. This may not handicap the use of citations in broad studies of knowledge
flows and externalities but fails to address the question of economic value so important to
other research.
A more direct approach would be to show that citations are linked to measurable
economic outcomes. The first study to do so was developed by Trajtenberg (1990a) in which
he showed that citations are highly correlated with estimates of the social value of the
patented inventions. Harhoff et al. (1999) demonstrated a relationship between citations and
estimates of value from a survey of German patent holders. Hall (Hall, 1999) presented
evidence of a relationship between citations and the market value of firms, the results of
which have been replicated by others (H. Shane & Klock, 1997).
A second theory posits that citations reflect the impact a patented invention has on
stimulating further inventions (Harhoff, Narin, Scherer, & Vopel, 1999). In a slightly
different version, citations demonstrate entry into economically valuable new technological
areas (Trajtenberg, 1990b). These concepts are not only more difficult to demonstrate
empirically, but also lack specificity. It is not clear whether these effects are purely
externalities, or if there is some private value associated with them.
There is sufficient evidence at this point to conclude that citations contain information
about both the public and private economic value of patents. There is a need, and an
opportunity therefore, to advance both the theoretical and empirical basis for citations
analysis. Sampat and Ziedonis (2004) recently attempted to clarify the theoretical issues by
proposing four hypotheses for the way in which citations represent private economic value.
The first hypothesis, "Citations represent the portion of social returns appropriated by the
patent holder," attempts to address the problem noted above that the basic theory of the
relationship between citations and value lacks clarity as to what citations actually represent in
terms of private value. This hypothesis implies that a significant number of the citations will
come either from the patent holder (eg. "self citations"), or from licensees (Sampat &
Ziedonis, 2004). In their study of licensing data, they find licensee citations account for a
relatively small proportion (16%) of the citations, concluding that this is not an important
effect. However, what constitutes a significant proportion for the purposes of the hypothetical
value effect is unresolved. It is possible that relatively few self-citations may indicate this
effect, and this may even be expected given that a single organization is likely to produce a
limited number of subsequent patents. It is important also to remember that very high citation
counts suggests citing by patents across broad technological fields (Lerner, 1994). Therefore,
it is possible that self-citations can be expected to represent less breadth and therefore be
associated with relatively fewer citations.
Sampat and Ziedonis' (2004) second hypothesis, "Citations reflect entry into
profitable areas of research," clarifies Trajtenberg's (1990b) idea by adding that the citations
result from patenting are, therefore, economically-induced. That is, the economic success of
the patent will incentivize further patenting with a direct impact on citations. Their third
hypothesis, "Citations indicate technological opportunities or market interest in a
technological area," captures the idea that citations represent profit potential as they arise out
of expectations of profit in fields with significant commercial activity. Finally, hypothesis
fbur states. "Citations result from public disclosure." This refers to the citations that arise
fiom the publicity a patent receives through commercial success. Although their results
provide limited support for the second, third, and fourth hypotheses (and particularly the
third), additional research is needed to explore this further (Sampat & Ziedonis, 2004). In
particular, difficulties in reliably matching patents with companies limits the extent to which
these hypothesized effects may be measured precisely.
It is also possible that the citations a patent receives as a result of the drafting and
examination processes may create a "publicity" effect in which the patented subject matter
becomes exposed to related patentees. In this hypothesis, citations represent the value a
patent creates as a result of its exposure to firms operating in the same technological field.
The private component of value in this mode would be expected to accrue primarily via
licensing.
All of these hypotheses are attempts to identify the mechanisms by which citations
indicate economic value. However, they are limited to the extent that they are not specific as
to the kind of value with which they are associated. In reality, patents are economically
complex and create value in a variety of different ways. Theories about the relationship
between citations and value need to be clarified to take into account not only the
public/private division of value, but also distinctions regarding the types of value. In fact,
different types of patent value relate to citations in different ways, and this is the subject of
the next chapter. This detailed discussion provides a foundation for subsequently developing
a more comprehensive theory of the relationship between citations and value.
Chapter 2: The Private Economic Value of Patents
From a private perspective, there are a variety of reasons for patenting and thus a
range of different ways in which holders of patents or patent rights realize value (Cohen,
Nelson, & Walsh, 2000). These modes or mechanisms translate into a complex picture for
the larger economy and raise a number of questions regarding the way that patents interact
with and promote innovation in the economy. It is useful in this context to characterize these
different mechanisms as a way of providing a framework for understanding and evaluating
the literature on patent value. Specifically, the following discussion offers some key insights
on the use and meaning of citations, and provides context for further theoretical and
empirical work.
Types of Patent Value
Perhaps the most important key to unlocking the full potential of patent data as an
economic tool has been establishing a link with economic value. This is partly because
patents are known to be highly heterogeneous economic assets. That is, the value distribution
of patents in highly skewed (Schankerman, 1998) with only about 1 to 3 out of every 100
patents yielding significant private economic returns (Sapsalis & Potterie, 2007). This
renders the use of simple patent counts useless as measures of innovation or as indicators of
the value that patents embody (Trajtenberg, 1990b).
At least in theory, such a link could be established using standard econometric
techniques. However, this effort has been hampered by a number of factors. The first
problem is that there haven't been opportunities to directly observe the value of patents
(Trajtenberg, 1990b). The reason for this reveals the true complexity of patents as economic
entities. Patents can be used in a number of different ways to create value (Gans & Stem,
2003). In general, these modes either cannot be measured, or cannot be observed.
The following discussion presents a stylized typology of the different modalities that
patents have for producing economic value. The purpose of this section is not to be
exhaustive and rigorous, but to provide a simple framework for thinking about the ways that
patents can lead to economic value, where that value accrues, and how it might be measured
or estimated. The overriding objective is to clarify the specific challenges associated with
producing direct measures of patent value, and to clarify the interpretation of previous
studies.
1. Practice Value
The first and most obvious method for realizing economic value from patents is
producing and selling products which apply the patented subject matter. Value derives from
the producer's ability to exclude competitors and therefore earn monopoly rents (Jaffe &
Lerner, 2004). This is relevant whether the patent enables a new product or feature, whether
it provides efficiencies in production and distribution, or any of a wide range of other
potential benefits to the producer. In theory, the value of a patent in this scenario could be
seen as the net present value of the enhanced profits directly attributable to the existence of
the patent monopoly position.
In practice, this type of value is virtually impossible to measure directly. For one
thing, it is difficult to disaggregate the additional value that patent protection confers over
and above the value derived from all other inputs. In other words, it is nearly impossible to
say with any degree of certainty exactly how much value was attributable to the patent versus
other factors such as superior branding, timing, market power, other intellectual property,
existing manufacturing efficiencies, etc. Clearly this challenge is compounded when
attempting to aggregate data for econometric analyses. Another difficulty comes from the
fact that any given company will likely apply patented subject matter in one or at most a
small number of selected applications. For some patents there may be many potential
applications, and therefore the private returns will not properly measure the patent's full
economic potential.
Another dimesnion of this type of value is "blocking", which is the practice of
patenting substitutes for a strategically vital product exclusively for the purpose of preventing
the production of substitutes' (Cohen et al., 2000). However, the value from this kind of
patenting activity derives from practicing the core patents, and therefore should be viewed in
this context merely as a method for strengthening patent protection in a practicing regime.
2. License Value
A second mechanism for realizing value from patents is to license the rights to the
patented subject matter. It is important to note that licensing patents is a relatively new
phenomenon, and one that has grown dramatically, especially over the past two decades
(AUTM, 2004). Licensing offers the promise of significantly reducing the friction associated
with patenting and innovating, but fluid markets for patent rights have not yet emerged for
several reasons (Arora, Fosfuri, & Gambardella, 2000).
Nevertheless, the use of licensing revenues as a measure of patent value offers certain
benefits. For one, licensing allows the full potential of the patented subject matter to be
'This strategy is also frequently described as creating a "patent fence".
exploited for all applications. Second, the majority of licensing revenues come from royalties
which are calculated as a percentage of the licensee's sales of the product/service in which
the licensed rights were applied (Thursby, Jensen, & Thursby, 2001). Because of this, license
royalties also offer the potential to indirectly observe the value conceptualized under Section
1 above. In this view, the licensing value of a patent is merely a function of the value to the
licensee of practicing the patent rights. Finally, license transactions potentially provide an
opportunity to observe market dynamics relating to price, volume, etc. In theory, the value of
licensing could be calculated as the NPV of licensing revenues for all application areas. In
practice, these values are not observed due to the fact that the terms of licenses are generally
treated as confidential.
3. Litigation Value
The third stylized economic mechanism for realizing value from patents is actually a
derivative of both practicing and licensing and arises from its unique legal status. An entity
that does not practice or license a patent can sometimes receive value by leveraging the
special legal status of patents. In particular, some patent holders (often referred to as "patent
trolls") often use patents as an asset in a threatened or real patent infringement suit
(McDonough, 2006). In this case, the patent holder does not intend to practice the patent, but
seeks value through settlements, licenses, or even damages. The reason for distinguishing
this from the standard licensing model above is that this has become a unique and
increasingly visible business model (Orey, 2006). To the extent that patents are filed,
litigated, and transacted for the primary purpose of leveraging them via litigation, or the
threat of litigation, it is important to recognize this as a distinct mechanism for appropriating
value from patents.
Measuring this kind of patent value would theoretically encompass the settlements,
patent suit awards and damages, and revenues from resulting licenses. However, compiling
these in a systematic way is virtually impossible. Patent settlements and resulting licenses are
typically confidential and not tracked systematically. Patent suit awards and damages are also
not reliably reported.
4. Defensive Value
"Defensive" patenting refers to the practice of filing patents primarily for the purpose
of providing a basis for counter-infringement claims in patent infringement litigation. In a
sense, it is the opposite of litigation value. Defensive patenting has often been compared to
idea of "Mutually Assured Destruction" from counter-balancing nuclear threats (Orey, 2006).
As patent infringement litigation has accelerated, many companies have sought to expand
their patent portfolios so that, in response to an infringement claim, they could look for
counter infringement claims that they could bring against the opposing party to reduce the
potential value of the original action (Cohen et al., 2000). In this way, companies with large
portfolios have a resource that can be used to reduce the motivation for bringing patent
infringement claims against them.
The justification for including this in this typology of patent value is the fact that it
has become an increasingly important reason for filing patents, especially by major
corporations (Shapiro, 2001). Obviously, the measurement of this kind of value is
exceedingly difficult in practice as the very kind of value that is generated is largely
unknown even to the parties involved.
With this patent value typology, we proceed in the next chapter to relate the different
measures and estimates of patent value that have been developed in previous research to the
types of patent value that they measure or proxy for.
Chapter 3: Measuring Patent Value
In the absence of available direct measures of patent value, researchers have
developed a wide range of indirect measures or proxies of patent value (see Figure 1 below).
The majority of these indirect measures relate implicitly to the first type of patent value
creation above (practicing value), though this link is rarely made explicit (Harhoff et al.,
1999). Because any firm can potentially exploit any or all of the modes for creating private
economic value, and because most indirect measures do not allow distinguishing between
them, the majority of studies do not attempt to differentiate between the particular value
creation mechanisms.
This is an important point as it relates to previous studies of patent value. A consistent
feature of these studies has been that they have treated patent value in a generalized way, and
in some cases the concept of value has been indistinguishable from "quality" or "importance"
(Henderson et al., 1998; Lanjouw & Schankerman, 1999). Obviously, the difficulty in this is
that economic value, and particularly, private economic value is very different from concepts
such as scientific merit, scope, quality, and breadth, though it may be in part a function of all
of these (Lerner, 1994).
Moreover, based on the previous typology of patent value modes, it is probable that
the value of any given patent or patent grouping will be different in each mode. That is, a
patent is likely to have a different value if practiced than if it is licensed, used in litigation, or
in a defensive portfolio. The salient point is that there is a need to characterize, at least in a
general way, the kind of value different indirect measures are capable of representing in
order to be able to properly interpret the results.
Therefore, this section includes a review of previous patent value studies organized
by three different dimensions. The first dimension uses the patent value typology above to
examine what types of value each of the indirect measures connect to. The second dimension
looks at the source of data that is being leveraged. Finally, the studies are organized into a
framework that allows the different measures and methodologies to be compared.
Indirect Measures of Value
Following on the typology of patent value proposed above, this section organizes
previous studies on patent value to characterize the various indirect measures of patent value
that have been utilized in terms of how they relate to the patent value modes described. As
mentioned above, most studies have utilized indirect measures of patent value that generally
relate to the first and most important type of patent value: practicing the patent.
The first set of proxies emerged from the patent data itself. Theoretically they were
derived from the idea that the very existence of patents is evidence of a deliberate investment
decision and value judgment as indicated by the investment in prosecuting the patent from
initial filing through issuance and then maintaining it potentially all the way to termination.
Extensive expenditures must be made for filing fees, attorney fees, and maintenance fees to
accomplish this. These indicate at the very least that the patent holder has an expected value
which exceeds the cost of patent prosecution, and that multiple experts have assessed its
technical and legal merit.
Patent Renewals
One of the first proxies for patent value to emerge in the literature was the data
regarding patent renewals (Pakes et al., 1988; Pakes & Simpson, 1989). The intuition for this
is that patent holders are more likely to pay the fees associated with renewing patents if they
have produced, or are expected to produce, value (Schankerman & Pakes, 1986). There have
been two distinct uses of patent renewals in the literature. The first were studies that designed
and evaluated models based on the fundamental intuition as described above (Lanjouw,
1998; Schankerman & Pakes, 1986). Additional studies have utilized renewals data as an
independent variable (Harhoff et al., 1999; Lanjouw & Schankerman, 1999). Findings have
consistently evidenced a relationship between citations and renewals, though the results are
somewhat noisy.
Family Size
The decision to file a patent in foreign jurisdictions has been hypothesized to be
another indicator of existing or expected value, much like renewals data. These additional
filings comprise a patent "family", the size of which roughly approximates its international
scope and is a relatively good proxy for the total cost of patenting. This is discussed at more
length below. Patent family data come from the patent data and have been used primarily as
an independent variable and indicator of expected value (Guellec & Potterie, 2000; Harhoff,
Frederic, & Katrin, 2003; Harhoff et al., 1999; Lanjouw & Schankerman, 1999; Sampat &
Ziedonis, 2004; Sapsalis & Potterie, 2007).
Patent Grant
Some studies have suggested that a patent being granted is a strong indication of its
value and have used this to test for relationship with other observable characteristics from the
patent data such as, the number and nationality of inventors, fields, patenting procedures and
others (Guellec & Potterie, 2000, 2002).
Litigation Data
Another source of data that have been leveraged come from databases drawn from the
legal world including court documents, and databases of legal actions relating to patents.
Some studies have examined the potential information value of the existence of patent
infringement litigation as the dependent variable proxy for value (Harhoff & Reitzig, 2004; J.
Lanjouw & M. A. Schankerman, 1997). Given the typology of patent value enumerated
above, it is also worth noting here that there may be additional information in this type of
litigation data given that it represents an embodiment of the litigation value mode described,
and therefore could potentially be seen as a proxy for that type of value in particular. In
practice, there is little promise for this kind of use as the majority of patent litigation arises
within the course of practicing patents. However, over the past few years there has been a
growing controversy regarding so-called "patent trolls" that acquire and hold patents
presumably exclusively for the purpose of monetizing them via the litigation mode . This
practice has been cast as predatory and has been used to justify proposed reforms of the
patent system (Sag & Rohde, 2006). Despite this, it is very difficult to distinguish from the
licensing mode which is also often motivated and enforced through legal action
(McDonough, 2006).
Financial Data
A very different approach used in some studies has been to look for information about
the value of patents in the value of the firms that hold them (Hall, 1999). The intuition is that
some portion of the value of firms is contributed by the value of its patents. Firms with more
valuable patent portfolios will be more valuable, and this differential in value should be
detectable using econometric techniques (Hall, 1999; Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2005; Hall
et al., 2000; Lerner, 1994; H. Shane & Klock, 1997; Trajtenberg, 1990a, 1990b). The data for
this have been drawn primarily from stock valuations for publicly-traded companies.
Finn Creation
Using a related concept, Shane (2001) utilized the creation of new firms based on
patented technologies as an indirect indicator of patent value. The data for this study were
compiled from patents licensed by MIT's technology transfer office.
Defensive Patenting
No measures of the defensive value of patents have been developed or tested in the
literature.
Direct Measurements of Patent Value
As noted, there have been virtually no opportunities to systematically measure patent
value in a direct way for any of the value types defined above. This presents an important
problem for the entire field of patent analysis because of the central role that value plays
across a wide range of research thrusts. It is possible that some of the indirect measures that
have been used are valid proxies for some kind of economic value. However, in order to be
confident in utilizing them, they must first be validated using some kind of reliable direct
measurement of value. One attempt to accomplish this (Harhoff et al., 1999) provided a
tantalizing confirmation of forward citations using data from a survey of patent holders in
which they were asked to estimate, in hind-sight, the minimum price they would have been
willing to sell each patent. This can be seen as a kind of rough approximation of the licensing
value, and benefits from its ex post perspective on value.
Licensing Data
Although it can be viewed as conceptually derivative of practicing value, licensing
value has come to be a very important alternative route to commercializing and monetizing
patent rights. Licensing value could theoretically be measured in two different ways. The
first, and most direct, approach is to measure the revenues generated from licensing. The
second approach would be to use data regarding the licensing status of the patent, or in other
words, if the patent is licensed or not. This approach is actually an indirect measurement
because it indicates only that the patent is expected to have value. This is a slightly stylized
characterization of course, because as was noted above, not all types of patent value produce
a measurable revenue stream.
Sampat & Ziedonis (2004) utilized a set of data drawn from two major licensing
universities in which both direct (licensing revenues) and indirect (licensed status) data were
observed (Sampat & Ziedonis, 2004). This study is also unique in that it analyzed patent
value from multiple units of analysis including both the patent and the patent family level.
This approach seems to offer the potential for further research if similar information from
other contexts and/or more representative datasets can be compiled.
At a higher level of abstraction, this study offers data on whether a patent was
licensed or not, which is actually an indirect measure of licensing value or expected practice
value. While this may initially appear to be of much less interest than the more direct and
continuous revenue data, it offers an intriguing opportunity. There are two reasons for this.
The first is that gaining access to licensing revenue data is somewhat difficult due to the
practice of keeping licensing transactions confidential. In addition, compiling this data is
resource intensive. For both these reasons, it is likely that data on the licensing status of
patents could be much more accessible.
The second reason is that interpreting revenue data presents certain theoretical and
methodological difficulties (see Chapter 4). In particular, revenue data are truncated in time
which makes comparing them like comparing revenues from different movies that have been
out for different amounts of time. The problem is compounded in the case of licenses because
the terms vary dramatically and because returns which are truly representative of the patent's
ultimate economic potential cannot be expected in many cases for several years or more.
License revenues often include reimbursements for past patenting expenses, and these are
normally the only revenues that accrue in the early years of a license. Perhaps most
problematic of all is the reality that in many cases licenses are effectively paid for through
research funding that does not appear in the licensing revenues at all.
If licensing status can be validated as a meaningful correlate of patent value, then the
effort to obtain a greatly expanded data set may be justified. In fact, there may also be a
theoretical basis for pursuing this approach. First, given the problems mentioned above, it is
possible that the existence of a license is a less noisy indicator of the intrinsic patent value
than revenues. Transacting a license is actually a very costly exercise which not only entails
assuming the full previous costs of patent prosecution, but also an often lengthy negotiation
process. Therefore, the existence of a license can be seen as a strong indication that the
licensee believes it will receive private economic value. In this way it is a similar measure to
patenting and renewals. However, at least theoretically, it may be better calibrated to actual
value since at this stage the patent has almost always issued (Dechenaux, Goldfarb, Shane, &
Thursby, 2005), and the licensee is presumably in a position to have much greater visibility
on its economic potential both by virtue of the more advanced stage (Dechenaux, Goldfarb,
Shane, & Thursby, 2003) and their knowledge of its actual use and their position close to the
field of application.
Sampat and Ziedonis (2004) tested both revenue and status data in their study using
licensing data compiled from Columbia University and the University of California. The
analysis demonstrated a strong relationship between forward citations and the probability a
patent was licensed, but failed to find any meaningful relationship between revenue data and
forward citations (Sampat & Ziedonis, 2004). This result may be a confirmation of the
discussion above but it obviously does not validate the use of license status data as a viable
alternative to revenue data.
Table 1: Direct & Indirect Measures of Patent Value
Value Mode Direct Measures Indirect Measures
1. Practice Commercialization returns Patent Renewals
attributable to patent Family Size
Patent Grant
Litigation
Firm Value
Firm Creation
2. License License revenues Licensed (Y/N)
3. Litigation Patent suit awards, damages, Litigation (Y/N)
settlements
4. Defensive None None
Units of Measure
One very important aspect of measuring patent value that has received little treatment
in the literature is the unit of measure. Many patent value studies have emphasized the
individual patent filing as the target of analysis primarily because the patent data that have
been available from the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) are in this form2. Each
individual patent filing is entered as a record into the USPTO database and receives a unique
identification number. Over the past few years, patent data have been improved by various
service providers such as Delphion 3, and it is now possible to obtain a patent's related filings,
or "family."
Individual patent filings are related in two ways. First, the process of issuing a patent,
or patent prosecution, often results in filings being split into multiple derivative filings that
2 Important exceptions to this are Harhoffet al., (2003), Sampat et al., (2004), Sapsalis and Potterie (2007),
Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999).
3 http://www.delphion.com/
cover more specific definitions of the subject matter. Second, patent filings in the US often
precede filings of the same subject matter in foreign jurisdictions. The result of both of these
processes is a patent "family"4 .
Patent families are very important in understanding value (Harhoff et al., 2003;
Sapsalis & Potterie, 2007). This is because the value of patent rights is partly a function of
the geographic scope of those rights. A patent family with greater geographic coverage will
theoretically have greater value, all other things being equal. Another reason is that patents
which have led to "continuations," or further related patents, often have more technological
scope and/or greater temporal coverage.
The greater technological scope and temporal coverage is the result of splitting the
subject matter of a single patent into more specific, and presumably more collectively
comprehensive, filings. Greater technological scope has been associated in the literature with
greater economic value (J. Lanjouw & M. A. Schankerman, 1997; Lerner, 1994; Merges &
Nelson, 1990). This is actually the result of the common strategy of filing an initial
provisional patent with somewhat generalized claims, and then filing a series of
continuations that both split and refine the subject matter while extending the time until final
patents issue (Lemley & Moore, 1905). Although some abuses of this approach have been
curtailed through legal and policy innovations (Jaffe & Lerner, 2004), the basic approach
remains in common practice.
In addition to family size representing the kind of intrinsic value described above, it
also can be viewed from the perspective of expected value on the part of the patent holder, or
4 In practice the exact definition of what constitutes a "family" varies between jurisdictions and database
providers. For this study, family data were obtained from Delphion which includes only foreign filings.
"assignee" 5. Obviously the strategy of making multiple continuations, or of filing in a
number of foreign jurisdictions, significantly increases the investment (Sapsalis & Potterie,
2007)6. It is reasonable to expect that patent applicants undertaking these investments have a
greater expectation of the value of the patents in the family as a group7 . As Sapsalis and
Potterie (2007) have also shown, the analysis of patent families can extend to weight specific
jurisdictions or combinations thereof to indicate a specific pattern of value.
The trend for patents to become more "global" has been sharply on the rise in recent
years, with growth in foreign patenting rising approximately 65% faster than the already
rapid growth in domestic patenting (WIPO, 2006). It is important to note that patenting
remains concentrated overall with the top five jurisdictions (US, Japan, Korea, China and the
European Patent Office) accounting for 75% of worldwide patent applications (WIPO, 2006).
Another potential unit of analysis that emerges from examining patent licensing data
is the level of the license agreement. Generally, a license agreement will include all of the
family members for each of the licensed patents. Often this includes a single patent family,
but in many cases combines several patent families. The importance of this is the way that
the license agreement itself defines the unit of value in a way that is relevant to the
transacting parties. Sampat and Ziedonis (2004) have conducted the only published study of
which this author is aware utilizing this unit of measure. Many other potential approaches to
grouping patents for value analyses can be conceptualized but are beyond the scope of this
study.
5 "Assignee" refers to the owner of the patent, rather than to the specific named inventors.
6 This is often an amount that is many times the cost of individual US filings.
7 It is also important to note that foreign filings must be made within a limited period of time (usually 18
months) of the original US filing, and this is normally prior to the realization of much value from the patents.
Therefore, the investment can be viewed as a good indicator of expected, rather than realized, value.
Patent Field
In the context of the analysis contained in this study, it is important to mention the
relevance of technological field to patent value. Many studies have demonstrated that
different technological fields or sectors are associated with very different attributes in the
patent data (Hall et al., 2001; Schankerman, 1998). Without attempting a comprehensive
review of these effects, I wish to highlight two of particular relevance to this study.
First, when broadly defined technology fields are aggregated over the data, a
consistent finding is that the category comprised primarily of biological, medical,
pharmaceutical, and chemical patents exhibits some unique attributes (Mansfield, 1986;
Schankerman, 1998). In particular, patents are thought to be relatively more enforceable and
somewhat more important to businesses operating in the medical sector because of the highly
scientific nature, but also because of the high investments associated with regulation and
approvals (Cohen et al., 2000; Scherer, 1993). This contributes to the argument for "patent
thickets" particularly in bio-medical sciences where patent rights are more important overall,
and more patents may be required to bring any single project to fruition (Thumm, 2005).
Because of the importance of bio-medical patents to their related industries, they
constitute a significant portion of licensing transactions, and especially of those licenses
coming out of universities and other research organizations. As a result, some of the most
active licensing organizations are medical schools and medical research hospitals (AUTM,
2004). Bio-medical/pharmaceuticals are the fields where patents are thought to be the most
important to commercial success, where companies rely on them the most, and where they
presumably serve the intended function the best (Harhoff et al., 2003; Schankerman, 1998).
Therefore, it is hypothesized that these patents offer the greatest potential for appropriability,
particularly in a licensing regime. Figure 1 summarizes the previous literature on citations
and patent value.
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Chapter 4: Study Design and Data
This study examines the relationship between citations and private economic value by
analyzing the patenting and licensing portfolios of two medical research hospitals
specializing in cancer research. This data offer a unique opportunity to test the relationship
using data that directly observe at least one type of private value. This chapter describes the
data within the context of the theory and typology from the previous chapters and examines
some of its attributes, characteristics, and idiosyncrasies.
Description of Dataset
This unique dataset was obtained from two public research institutions 8 containing
information on their entire current stock of inventions, patents, and licenses. The data were
extracted directly from each institution's patenting and licensing management database
system in January, 2007. Extracting and merging the data was facilitated significantly by the
fact that both institutions used the same commercial database management system and data
were in exactly the same format.
Because the full dataset contained information on a large number of patent filings
which were abandoned, never filed, or which have expired, the majority of records cannot be
analyzed. The institutional data were then matched to data from the public patent database to
add data on citation counts, claims, patent application and publication dates, and family size9.
Out of a total of 5703 patent filing records from the combined institutional data, 686 patents
were matched with the full data. Institutional data included whether each patent was licensed
8 Data provided by Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, and Dana-Farber Cancer Institute.
9 Public patent data were obtained using Delphion (http://www.delphion.com).
and how much revenue had been received on related licenses, and the necessary information
for grouping the patents according to license agreement. The resulting dataset form the basis
of most of the analyses contained in this study.
Private Licensing Value
Within the context of citations research, this data has a very specific and limited
application which can be characterized using the discussion from the preceding chapters.
First, this data include only patents which were filed by public research institutions
exclusively for the purpose of licensing'l . Patenting and licensing by universities, research
hospitals, non-profit research institutes, and government laboratories has one important
driver of a significant expansion in patent licensing over the past 25 years since the passage
of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 (Mowery, 2004). The dramatic expansion of patenting and
licensing by public research institutions has been amply documented elsewhere, and for
several reasons has become a major thrust of the literature in its own right (Henderson et al.,
1998; Mowery, 2004). For the present study, it is important to note that because these
institutions file patents solely for the purpose of licensing them, the resulting patents are
expected to express only the "licensing" type of private economic value defined in Chapter 2.
Previous research indicates that patents held by these institutions are different from those
held by other organizations (Trajtenberg & Henderson, 1997), which both clarifies and limits
the interpretation of the results from the analysis. Some implications of this are discussed in
more detail with the results in Chapter 5.
10 Since "licensing" can be subject to slightly varying definitions different technology licensing offices, this
study defines license as any type of agreement which encumbers the patent rights for any length of time and
which either produces or has the ability to produce revenues. This can include licenses, options, research and
license agreements, and other instruments.
Unit of Analysis
This dataset includes both direct and indirect observations of patent value. The direct
observation is the total revenue received by related license agreements. These agreements
frequently contain entire patent families, and there is no basis either in the data or in theory
for assigning particular shares of value to individual members of the patent family.
Therefore, all analyses in which revenue is the dependent variable are conducted using the
original US filing. The other observation of value is the licensing status of the patent (eg.
"licensed" or "not licensed"). This is analyzed at the level of the individual patent.
Patent Field
The data for this study are drawn exclusively from medical research institutions
operating in a somewhat narrowly-defined field. This further narrows the interpretation of
results based on the expectation that patents from public research institutions may be
qualitatively different from those filed by commercial entities (Griliches, 1990; Henderson et
al., 1998; Jaffe & Trajtenberg, 1993; Trajtenberg & Henderson, 1997). Patents coming from
these organizations are generally thought to be more "basic" or scientific and this is expected
to increase the citations they receive, though the effect appears to be much less than expected
(Henderson et al., 1998).
In addition, as noted above, many studies and substantial anecdotal information
demonstrate that patents in the broad area of medical and pharmaceutical technologies
exhibit distinct attributes (Schankerman, 1998). In particular, patents in this field are thought
to be more important to production and commercial success (Hall et al., 2005), have been
growing faster as a proportion of total patent filings since at least 1975, and receive relatively
more citations overall than other categories except computers and communications (Hall et
al., 2001). The common conclusion is that drugs and medical patents have greater
appropriability and this is probably especially true for licensing.
Drugs and medical patents have special significance in patent licensing and for public
research institutions in particular. This segment represents the most significant component in
licensing and account for the majority of licensing revenues (AUTM, 2004). For example, 3
out of the top 5 public research institutions by licensing income in 2004 were medical
research hospitals, not universities (AUTM, 2004). Of the top 25, only one (MIT l') did not
have a medical school or was not a research hospital, as opposed to 64% of survey
respondents overall (AUTM, 2004). The existence of strong medical research is considered
to be the most important predictor of success in licensing for universities and other public
research institutions (Bulut & Moschini, 2006). Therefore, by virtue of the narrow field of
the participating institutions, the patent data examined in this study can be expected to
contain disproportionately more patents with high licensing potential. Because of this, the
present study effectively examines the "intensive margin" of patents located in the most
active licensing segment.
Selection Bias
A particular issue regarding the data compiled for this study relates to a selection bias
of the included patents. The technology licensing offices (TLO's) of public research
institutions vary in their practices concerning filing patents on disclosed technologies. It is
" It can be argued that MIT is closely associated with a major medical school and medical research hospitals
through its partnership with Harvard Medical School as well as the Broad and Whitehead Institutes.
common practice for many institutions to file less expensive provisional patent applications
for most disclosed technologies and search for a licensee during the one year period before
the application must be converted to the much more expensive status of a full application.
Although, this practice is not universal, the proportion of disclosures receiving at least a
provisional patent application has risen steadily from 26% in 1991 to 62% in 2004 (AUTM,
2004). This means that public research institutions are filing new applications 12 on the
majority of technology disclosures they receive.
Based on the author's previous experience and anecdotal evidence (no systematic
data on patent practice exist) a substantial proportion of the institutions only subsequently
convert filings for which an interested licensee has been identified. Therefore, patents from
these institutions for which citations data are available may be expected to have a
disproportionately high licensing rate and be expected to display a less skewed value
distribution than a broader sample of patents.
Table 2 shows the breakdown of the patents in the dataset. The results are actually
remarkably similar to the results presented by Sampat and Ziedonis (2004)13. It is evident
that a relatively high proportion of the patents have been licensed, though not as high as
might be expected given the approach described above. One explanation for this may be that
the data include many patents which are relatively new, and may not have had enough time
to find a licensee. This relates to the very important issue of truncation which is discussed
next.
12 "New" filings are defined as the first filing of the patentable subject matter, and constituted 76% of total
annual filings in 2004 (AUTM, 2004). The proportion of new filings by public research institutions being made
initially in the US has gone down steadily from around 76% in 1994 to only 35% in 2004. Subsequent filings
(not "new") include divisional filings and foreign applications with foreign applications constituting the largest
share.
" Their data, drawn from the University of California and Columbia University showed the same proportion of
licensed (41%) and unlicensed (59%) patents.
Table 2: Summary of Data Sample
Sample Data (n=686) Number % of Total
Licensed 278 41%
Unlicensed 408 59%
Revenues > 0 253 37%
Revenues = 0 433 63%
Citations > 0 449 65%
Citations = 0 237 35%
Truncation
An important characteristic of patent and licensing data is that ultimate outcomes are
not observed, only the results to the time of observation. This is known as truncated or "right-
censored" data (Hall et al., 2001). This has two important implications for citation analyses.
First, the data report the licensing status of the patents only as of the date the data were
extracted, not the ultimate licensing outcome. Therefore, patents listed as "not licensed" may
ultimately license, and this cannot be observed in the data. As mentioned above, this is partly
due to the fact that many of the patents in the dataset are relatively new. However, given that
the TLO begins marketing a patent virtually as soon as it is filed, a medical or drug patent
that issues has already been marketed to potential licensees for at least a few, and in many
cases several years. Further research may be warranted to explore the licensing time lag after
initial patent filing to determine the impact of this effect, if any.
In a similar way, revenues are also right-censored in time (Sampat & Ziedonis, 2004).
That is, the true value of a license (or patent) is not observed via revenues, but only the
fraction that has been earned to date. Since the actual distribution of revenues over time is
not known, making adjustments for revenue truncation is problematic. In other words, license
agreements may be "front-loaded" to realize the majority of the revenue early, or they may
be designed to emphasize royalties producing significant returns over an extended period.
Two techniques have been used in this study to address revenue truncation 4. In some
tests, a dummy for revenue was used (revenue = 1, no revenue = 0). The purpose of this is to
eliminate the impact that very few large observations have on the results. A second approach
was to organize patents into quartiles by revenue, and assign each quartile a categorical
value. The objective of this approach is to test for the general relationship of citations and
revenues. Table 3 shows the upper bound of each quartile in dollars. Both of these techniques
also partially address the skewness issue which is revisited below.
Table 3: Revenue Quartile Limits
Quartile Upper Bound
Quartile 1 $33,779.59
Quartile 2 $171,882.30
Quartile 3 $724,999.99
Quartile 4 $620,758,764.83
Lower bound $36. 00
Truncation also impacts citations. Patents can continue to receive citations
indefinitely, and therefore the citations that are observed represent some unknown fraction of
the ultimate number. The impact is greater for younger patents since the fraction of lifetime
citations earned in early years is very small (Hall et al., 2001). A number of methodological
"' Because revenue is only observed at the level of the license agreement, patents were grouped by agreement
fior all calculations and regressions involving revenue.
solutions to the truncation problem as it relates to citations have been proposed (Hall et al.,
2005; Hall et al., 2001). There are actually two effects that must be removed.
The first is the truncation (right-censoring) of the citation data that makes it
inappropriate to compare the total citation counts for patents of different ages. The simplest
method for resolving this is to deflate citations by the age of the patent, producing an
"average citations per year" figure. The problem with this approach is that because citations
are not received uniformly throughout the life of the patent, very young patents will be
under-measured. Figure 2 displays the mean citations received annually after application for
all patents.
Figure 2: Mean Annual Citations Received After
Application - All US Patents
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Years After Application
Source: Data derived from USPTO, 2006. (approximately 4 mm patents)
Comparing the distribution of all patents with those in the dataset (Figure 3) indicates
a roughly similar distribution. Finally, separating the licensed and unlicensed patents in the
sample (Figure 4) shows that the mean of licensed patents is consistently greater than
unlicensed patents until they cross in the 15th year.
Figure 3: Mean Annual Citations Received After
Application - All vs. Sample Patents
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Figure 4: Mean Annual Citations Received After
Application - All vs. Licensed & Unlicensed Patents
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This raises the second truncation issue, which is the observation from previous
studies that the propensity to cite and receive citations is not static but has changed over time
(Hall et al., 2001). Selecting a technique to compensate for citation truncation relies on the
development of a hypothesis regarding the meaning of citations data. For instance, one
I
hypothesis is that changes in the propensity to cite over time merely reflect the changing
nature of the patenting process, including: the advent of electronic patent databases that make
identifying and citing prior art easier, the dramatic increase in patenting which increases the
ratio of citing to cited patents, changes in patent rules, and changes in the resources of the
patent office, just to name a few (Hall et al., 2001). An alternative hypothesis is that changes
in citation frequencies are indicative of actual changes in the meaning and value of patents.
To accept the first hypothesis and adjust for this effect, citations received (forward
citations) for each patent should be compared only to other patents of the same vintage. In
this study, data were obtained 5 that provide annual citations for every patent, and this was
used to calculate both the mean citations received by annual cohort, as well as annual means
for citations received in each year following patent application for each cohort year' 6. This
approach removes the effect of the changing propensity to cite over time by comparing
patents only of the same age. It also eliminates the truncation problem"7. Accepting the
second hypothesis requires no such adjustment. Both approaches are implemented in this
study.
However, there remains the difficulty relating to truncation of very young patents
mentioned previously. Patents less than 1 year old have a likelihood of having received
citations that is close to zero, and therefore it is not possible to infer anything from the
observed zero values (Hall et al., 2005). In this way, the informational value of citation
15 Many thanks to Kyle Jensen for assistance in accessing, matching, and compiling the annual citations data for
all patents.
16 Annual cohorts included all patents applied for in each given year. Thus, all patents with application dates
during 1985 are included in the 1985 annual cohort.
17 This technique does not remove the "field effect" on citations, which is the observation that the propensity to
cite varies across fields identified by Hall et al., (2001). However, given the discussion above regarding the
special nature of many patents in the context of licensing, this study hypothesizes that a greater propensity to
receive citations by these patents is indicative of their greater appropriability (and therefore value) in a licensing
regime, and so no attempt has been made in this study to adjust for this effect.
counts decreases for patents younger than 3 years, and drops precipitously for patents less
than one year old. The number of patents in the present dataset that are likely to be
significantly impacted for licensing and citations is relatively small. A total of 57 patents in
the data (about 8%) had been published for less than one year, and 95 (about 14%) for less
than two years as of the date of extraction.
Although it may be tempting to remove these young patents in an attempt to minimize
the impact of truncation, it can potentially be more distorting than leaving them in. This is
because very little is known about the relationship between licensing and citations. No
previous study has examined the extent to which there may be simultaneous effects in the
relationship between citations and licensing, and at present, data are not available to test for
this effect. This relates to the hypothesis regarding the relationship between citations and
private value in which a "publicity" effect results from the process of citing prior art. This
may lead to increased awareness of the patent, and therefore have a positive impact on the
probability of the patent being licensed (Sampat & Ziedonis, 2004).
This leads to the more general question of causation, or the degree to which citations
create value or the reverse, and the extent to which there may be simultaneous effects
between the two. Sampat and Ziedonis (2004) found that few citations were received by
patents prior to licensing, providing possible support for their third and fourth hypotheses' 8,
and for the idea that citations may have a positive influence on licensing outcomes. Huang's
(Huang, 2006) research also indicates that citations demonstrate a kind of simultaneity.
However, answering the more fundamental question of causation is not within the scope of
a "Hypothesis 3: Citations indicate technological opportunities or market interest in a technological area.
Hypothesis 4: Citations result from public disclosure." (Sampat and Ziedonis, 2004)
this study, and therefore the data on relatively newer patents has not been removed from the
analyses.
Skewness
Another challenge with the data is the highly skewed nature of both the citations and
revenues data (Lanjouw et al., 1998). Overall, the top 5% of licenses account for 98% of the
revenues. Therefore, a log transformation of revenues is used in this study as the dependent
variable rather than gross revenues. The distribution of citations is also highly skewed, so log
transformations of citations have also been used in some of the tests for comparative
purposes with substantially the same results as the non-transformed variable. Figure 5
presents a scatter plot of log revenues versus citations.
Figure 5: Scatterplot of Log Revenues vs. Citations
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Licensing Outcomes
Overall, 42% of the patents in the dataset are licensed, and the data show no clear
trend by the age of the patent (see Table 4 and Figure 6 below). However, there does seem to
be a pattern, and it may not be a coincidence that it appears to match macroeconomic
fluctuations. The years in which the NBER identifies economic recessions are shaded gray in
the Figure 6 (NBER, 2007). This seems to indicate that licensing outcomes track the business
cycle, and is a very interesting, though perhaps not surprising, result. This is an opportunity
for further research.
Table 4: Distribution of Licensing Outcomes by Application Year
Proportion of Patents
Unlicensed (%)
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Proportion of Patents
Licensed (%)
5
28
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40
64
62
53
42
32
36
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59
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41
13
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36
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Application
Year
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1984
1985
1986
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1997
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2000
2001
2002
2003
Total
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Figure 6: Proportion of Patents Licensed by Application
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As an initial look at the question of whether citations are related to licensing
outcomes, Table 5 and Figure 7 show the mean number of citations for both the licensed and
unlicensed patents in the sample. There does appear to be a relationship with licensed patents
displaying consistently higher levels of citations.
Table 5: Mean No. of Citations for Unlicensed and Licensed Patents
Application Mean No. of Citations Mean No. of Citations
Year Unlicensed Patents Licensed Patents
1984 12.46 14.80
1985 12.00 13.56
1986 4.66 7.83
1987 3.80 15.89
1988 10.87 8.69
1989 2.25 6.67
1990 5.43 14.20
1991 6.26 13.14
1992 8.56 12.00
1993 5.60 8.22
1994 7.07 8.47
1995 2.53 2.94
1996 2.23 4.90
1997 1.23 3.18
1998 1.33 1.18
1999 0.75 4.36
2000 0.55 4.64
2001 0.21 0.17
2002 0.19 0.18
2003 1.22 0
Total 4.88 6.63
Figure 7: Mean Citations for Unlicensed and Licensed
Patents by Application Year
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Figures 8 and 9 compare the citations received by the patents in the sample with all
US patents for each year cohort. These results are interesting in light of the studies that have
used citations to test whether patents from public research institutions have been trending
downward in value or significance over time, and particularly since the Bayh-Dole Act
triggered a significant increase in patenting for the institutions (Henderson et al., 1998; Jaffe
& Lerner, 2004; Mowery, 2004; Sampat, Mowery, & Ziedonis, 2003; Sapsalis, Bruno van
Pottelsberghe de la, & Ran, 2006). Citation counts for the sample group began a substantial
decrease in the early 1980s, shortly after Bayh-Dole was enacted. This was the period when
many institutions (including those providing the sample data used here) began active
patenting and licensing activities (AUTM, 2004)19, and during which was the largest increase
in patenting by public research institutions (Henderson et al., 1998; Sampat et al., 2003).
Figure 8: Mean Citations Received by Application Year
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19 AUTM defines the start date of technology transfer for an institution as the date after which at least one half-
time equivalent was devoted to patenting and licensing.
Figure 9: Mean Citations Received by Application Year -
2 Year Groupings
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Figures 10 and 11 present the distribution of forward citations for the sample data
over time. It is evident that, at least within this sample, the distribution curve peaks earlier
and drops off more quickly for licensed patents than it does for unlicensed patents. This
seems to confirm a previous study that showed that patents with value are those that are cited
more quickly, or earlier than other patents (Gay et al., 2005).
Figure 10: Mean Annual Citations Received After
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Figure 11: Mean Annual Citations Received After
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This may also demonstrate that licensing has a negative impact on citations received,
but further research is required to explore this effect more fully. This kind of "chilling" effect
could theoretically come from two different mechanisms. First, it could be that the
investment subsequent to licensing by the licensee company reduces the incentive for
competitors to enter the market and therefore file related patents thus reducing the pool of
potentially citing patents. Second, once the license is public knowledge, subsequent filings
may be drafted "around" the original patent so as to avoid citing it as prior art, and therefore,
to avoid infringement and licensing. This may be one example of a simultaneous effect in the
relationship between citations and licensing, and one that potentially applies to other types of
value such as practicing, and especially litigation.
Chapter 5: Empirical Analyses and Findings
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between citations and the
private value of patents. To accomplish this, a series of regression models have been
estimated using data on a group of patents and their licensing outcomes obtained from two
major public research institutions operating in the area of medical research 2 0. This Chapter
presents the empirical methods used to specify the models and the findings.
Variables
The data in this study provides two measures of economic value for the dependent
variable. The first is the license status for each patent, or in other words, whether the patent
has been licensed ("licensed"). The second measure is the total revenue earned on any
licenses to date. These are somewhat different measures of value in both the theoretical and
empirical dimensions.
Licensing Status (licensed)
Whether a patent is licensed may be the most basic measure of the licensing value of
a patent. Because of the cost and effort required to negotiate and transact a license
agreement, this can be seen as representing a substantial value expectation on the part of both
the licensor and licensee (Sampat & Ziedonis, 2004). However, a number of licenses never
20 In order to disguise information that is confidential in nature, there is no separation of the data by
organization for analytical purposes in this study. The institutions were chosen specifically for their similarity
on several levels and therefore the data were not expected to be substantively different.
produce significant revenues2 1. These are often licensed to startups that fail, but also include
licenses to major companies that never reach the market as commercial products. Therefore,
this measure must be understood as the expected value, and therefore an indirect measure of
actual value. The value of licensed is binary (1 =Yes, 0=No), and therefore probit models
have been estimated for equations using this as the dependent variable.
Table 6: Licenses, Patents, & Outcomes
Total Licenses 110
Licenses Earning Revenues 86
Total Patents 686
Licensed Patents 278
Patents Earning Revenues 253
Unlicensed Patents 408
Revenues (revln)
The second measure in the data allows for a more direct observation of the actual
value of patents via the licensing revenues. Revenues are reported as total cumulative
amounts received, and a log transformation is used in all models.
Citations
The primary independent variable is the total number of citations received. As
described above, there are two versions used in the models. The first, "cites_deftage," is
simply the total count of forward citations divided by the age of the patent in years. This
21 Reliable data are not available on the proportion of licenses that never produce income. However, data from
the AUTM Annual Survey (2004) show that about 60% of active licenses to public research institutions were
yielding income in 2004.
variable is designed to adjust for truncation. The second, "cites_defl_cohortcites," divides the
total count of forward citations by the average number of forward citations for all patents
within the age cohort. The age cohort is composed of all patents with application dates in the
same calendar year. This variable is designed to adjust for both truncation and for the
changing propensity to cite.
Controls
Four variables have been used as controls in the model specifications: backward
citations, family size, claims, and publication lag. Table 8 lists the controls and provides
descriptions.
Table 7: Listing of Control Variables
Control Description
Backward Citations The total count of citations made by the patent to other patents
Family Size The total number of patents in the patent's family
Claims The total number of claims in the patent
Publication Lag The number of years between the application and publication dates
Descriptive Statistics
To gain an overall perspective on the dataset, Table 6 presents the descriptive
statistics for the variables used in this study.
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics of Basic Patent Variables
Forward Backward
Age of Patents Citations Citations Family Size Claims Revenue
Mean 11.91399 5.596210 4.916910 17.70991 15.02624 6353463.
Median 11.00000 2.000000 2.000000 9.000000 11.00000 0.000000
Maximum 31.00000 111.0000 158.0000 224.0000 101.0000 6.21E+08
Minimum 2.000000 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 1.000000 0.000000
Std. Dev. 6.081193 9.972016 13.03136 30.09603 14.01352 57854764
Skewness 0.689218 3.950742 8.079388 4.702260 2.487522 10.49764
Kurtosis 2.950589 27.78000 83.14356 28.93657 11.52278 111.5728
Jarque-Bera 54.38061 19336.10 191053.7 21756.22 2783.699 349541.6
Probability 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
Sum 8173.000 3839.000 3373.000 12149.00 10308.00 4.36E+09
Sum Sq. Dev. 25331.93 68117.15 116324.3 620453.3 134519.5 2.29E+18
Observations 686 686 686 686 686 686
Empirical Results
Several models were specified to test both dependent variables against both versions
of the citations variable, as well as additional models to include the controls. The first group
of models (1-2) were specified using "licensed" as the dependent variable. All patents (686)
were included in these equations because the level at which licensing status is observed is the
patent. Both of the citation variables described above are tested separately. For the second
group of equations (3-6), log revenues ("rev In") was the dependent variable. Because
revenues are only observed at the level of the license, only 422 "unique" patents are used in
models 3 and 4. Finally, models 5 and 6 look only at "unique" patents with revenues greater
than zero in order to examine the impact of citations on revenues. The results are summarized
in Table 9 below and all estimation output is included in the Appendix.
Table 9: Estimation Results
Tests (1-2)
Dependent Variable License Status (licensed)
Sample Group All patents
Sample Size 686
Method Probit
(3-4)
Revenues (rev In)
"Unique" Patents
422
OLS
(5-6)
Revenues (rev In)
"Unique" Patents with revenue
287
OLS
Cite defl_age 0.31 1.89 0.61
(3.45) (4.96) (2.64)
Cite defl cohortcites 0.12 0.87 0.37
(2.71) (3.99) (3.22)
Absolute value of z-statistics or t-statistics in parentheses.
Conclusions
The results confirm the existence of a consistent relationship between citation counts
and both measures of licensing value. This is the first study to show evidence of a
statistically significant relationship between citations and an objective, direct measure of
private patent value such as licensing revenues22. In fact, the strongest results came from
equations using licensing revenues as the dependent variable (see Appendix for detailed
estimation output).
In addition, it is possible also to view licensing revenues as an indirect measure of the
practicing value of the patents to the licensee, since licensing revenue comes primarily from
royalties paid on the licensees earnings from practicing the patent (AUTM, 2004). In this
way, these findings can also be seen as confirmatory of other studies that have used indirect
measures of practicing value, such as firm valuation (Hall, 1999; Hall et al., 2005; H. Shane
& Klock, 1997). In fact, it is likely that the relationship between the practicing value of
patents and license royalties paid is closer than it is to the firm's stock price.
22 This finding contrasts with Sampat and Ziedonis (2004) who found no statistically significant relationship in
their study of licensing revenue data from Columbia University. In their study, the authors used Tobit
regressions rather than the OLS method employed here, so the results are not directly comparable.
In general, within the context of the theoretical framework proposed above, these
results can be interpreted as a confirmation that forward citations counts contain information
about the private licensing value of patents. However, there are some important limitations to
this conclusion mentioned above that bear repeating here. First, the patents in this dataset
represent a particular field by virtue of their source, and therefore these results are not
necessarily applicable to other fields and sectors. In fact, there is evidence (discussed above)
that this field (medical) may be an important factor in these findings. However, more
research is needed to examine the impact of this effect, perhaps by examining similar data
with greater breadth across fields.
Second, these estimation results indicate that the impact of citation counts on the
licensing value of patents is small (though consistently statistically significant). In fact, it
would be surprising if it were otherwise. Chapter 2 of this study presented a typology of the
ways in which patents produce private economic value that was intended to highlight the
economic complexity of patents. Today patents are utilized, commercialized, leveraged, and
monetized in a diversity of ways. In some cases the private value can be calculated, but in
many cases it cannot. Therefore, these findings provide a confirmation of the idea suggested
above that many other factors contribute to a patent's private value, and that only some types
of that economic value can be measured.
Third, the patents analyzed here represent what may be a very unique type, patents
filed by public research institutions exclusively for the purpose of licensing (Trajtenberg &
Henderson, 1997). These patents are expected to be highly selected for their appropriability
in a licensing regime and are likely to have had commercial interest even before they are
published. They may also be more "basic" or scientific and, therefore, have broader
applications. In theory this should produce higher citation counts on average. Therefore, we
may expect these patents to tend toward the right tail of the private value distribution of all
patents. The evidence presented here is not conclusive on this point, but may offer limited
support for earlier studies indicating that the quality of patents filed by public research
institutions has decreased as the volume of filings increased over the past two decades
(Henderson et al., 1998).
One interesting finding was that the relationship between citation counts and
licensing value is stronger in all tests for the simple age-adjusted citation measure than for
the cohort-adjusted measure. One may conclude from this either that the changes in
propensities to cite are indicative of real changes in patents over time, or that citations
themselves have become increasingly noisy indicators of value. However these findings are
not conclusive on this point and further theory development and empirical research is needed
to address this question.
In general, the findings presented here can be interpreted as a validation of the
relationship between patent citation counts and the private value of patents using two
measures of licensing value. The findings here generally confirm results from previous
studies and offer what may be the first evidence of a significant relationship between
citations and a direct measurement of one type of patent value - licensing revenues. More
work is needed in validating these results using larger and more heterogeneous datasets, in
refining our theoretical understanding of the economic attributes and dynamics of patents,
and in developing data and techniques for more precise measurement. Such work is vital in
improving the economic "optics" that expose the dynamics of innovation to our view.
Appendix: Estimation Results
Table 10: Equation 1 Results
Dependent Variable: LICENSED
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)
Included observations: 686
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.
CITES DEFL AGE 0.310491 0.089937 3.452302 0.0006
FAMILY SIZE 0.007698 0.002443 3.150690 0.0016
NUM CLAIMS 0.005206 0.003537 1.471569 0.1411
PUB LAG YRS 0.090263 0.028239 3.196391 0.0014
NUM DOM REFS -0.018688 0.006430 -2.906285 0.0037
C -0.804134 0.130599 -6.157267 0.0000
Mean dependent var 0.405248 S.D. dependent var 0.491298
S.E. of regression 0.473817 Akaike info criterion 1.289707
Sum squared resid 152.6620 Schwarz criterion 1.329336
Log likelihood -436.3695 Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.305040
Restr. log likelihood -463.1064 Avg. log likelihood -0.636107
LR statistic (5 df) 53.47382 McFadden R-squared 0.057734
Probability(LR stat) 2.69E-10
Obs with Dep=0 408 Total obs 686
Obs with Dep=I 278
'Table 11: Equation 2 Results
Dependent Variable: LICENSED
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)
Included observations: 686
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.
CITES DEFL COHORTCITES 0.124366 0.045874 2.711007 0.0067
FAMILY SIZE 0.007850 0.002394 3.278267 0.0010
NUM CLAIMS 0.005386 0.003542 1.520556 0.1284
PUB LAG YRS 0.086163 0.028436 3.030021 0.0024
NUM DOM REFS -0.019527 0.006566 -2.973891 0.0029
C -0.757805 0.130244 -5.818357 0.0000
Mean dependent var 0.405248 S.D. dependent var 0.491298
S.E. of regression 0.475899 Akaike info criterion 1.298076
Sum squared resid 154.0064 Schwarz criterion 1.337705
Log likelihood -439.2400 Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.313409
Restr. log likelihood -463.1064 Avg. log likelihood -0.640292
LR statistic (5 df) 47.73266 McFadden R-squared 0.051535
Probability(LR stat) 4.03E-09
Obs with Dep=0 408 Total obs 686
Obs with Dep= 1 278
Table 12: Equation 3 Results
Dependent Variable: REV LN
Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 422
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
CITES DEFL AGE 1.894532 0.381398 4.967331 0.0000
NUM CLAIMS 0.044665 0.016998 2.627701 0.0089
NUM DOM REFS -0.037203 0.024443 -1.522047 0.1288
PUB LAG YRS 0.320539 0.147140 2.178465 0.0299
FAMILY SIZE 0.013283 0.011784 1.127255 0.2603
C 0.130114 0.654128 0.198913 0.8424
R-squared 0.085639 Mean dependent var 2.674394
Adjusted R-squared 0.074649 S.D. dependent var 5.168094
S.E. of regression 4.971455 Akaike info criterion 6.059418
Sum squared resid 10281.59 Schwarz criterion 6. 116930
Log likelihood -1272.537 F-statistic 7.792535
Durbin-Watson stat 0.152356 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001
Table 13: Equation 4 Results
Dependent Variable: REV_LN
Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 422
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
CITES DEFL COHORTCITES 0.869843 0.217534 3.998646 0.0001
NUM CLAIMS 0.044521 0.017168 2.593323 0.0098
NUM DOM REFS -0.042731 0.024680 -1.731377 0.0841
PUB LAG YRS 0.308937 0.149163 2.071135 0.0390
FAMILY SIZE 0.016761 0.011841 1.415483 0.1577
C 0.287268 0.664806 0.432109 0.6659
R-squared 0.067256 Mean dependent var 2.674394
Adjusted R-squared 0.056045 S.D. dependent var 5.168094
S.E. of regression 5.021183 Akaike info criterion 6.079324
Sum squared resid 10488.31 Schwarz criterion 6.136836
Log likelihood -1276.737 F-statistic 5.999171
Durbin-Watson stat 0.126947 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000022
Table 14: Equation 5 Results
Dependent Variable: REV LN
Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 253
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
CITES DEFL AGE 0.612527 0.232130 2.638728 0.0089
NUM CLAIMS -0.013617 0.011835 -1.150570 0.2510
NUM DOM REFS 0.071643 0.027931 2.564969 0.0109
PUB LAG YRS -0.193203 0.090184 -2.142314 0.0331
FAMILY SIZE -0.014813 0.004728 -3.133211 0.0019
C 13.17858 0.441537 29.84706 0.0000
R-squared 0.102815 Mean dependent var 12.46564
Adjusted R-squared 0.084653 S.D. dependent var 2.829399
S.E. of regression 2.706992 Akaike info criterion 4.852983
Sum squared resid 1809.968 Schwarz criterion 4.936779
Log likelihood -607.9024 F-statistic 5.661087
Durbin-Watson stat 0.120951 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000058
Table 15: Equation 6 Results
Dependent Variable: REV_LN
Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 253
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
CITES DEFL COHORTCITES 0.374150 0.116182 3.220383 0.0015
NUM CLAIMS -0.012995 0.011742 -1.106671 0.2695
NUM DOM REFS 0.066869 0.027760 2.408870 0.0167
PUB LAG YRS -0.176195 0.089827 -1.961478 0.0509
FAMILY SIZE -0.015107 0.004686 -3.223949 0.0014
C 13.11964 0.433143 30.28939 0.0000
R-squared 0.114695 Mean dependent var 12.46564
Adjusted R-squared 0.096774 S.D. dependent var 2.829399
S.E. of regression 2.689010 Akaike info criterion 4.839653
Sum squared resid 1786.002 Schwarz criterion 4.923449
Log likelihood -606.2161 F-statistic 6.399962
Durbin-Watson stat 0.124998 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000013
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